It should not be a surprise if the security software industry paints a picture of phishing that best serves its commercial aims. That is what business does.

What is surprising is that such a picture is the only one there is – like burglary figures available only from locksmiths.

As phishing attacks continue to rocket – from 1,714 in 2005 to a massive 14,156 last year – the need for a coherent response is more important than ever.

But currently the only information comes from those with an axe to grind: either financial institutions keen to protect their reputations, or security suppliers with an eye on market opportunities.

The confusion is a result of mismanagement by the Home Office.

The first stage in problem-solving of any kind is to establish the nature and extent of the task.

But, although electronic crime is completely unrelated to geography, responsibility for addressing it is fragmented across all 42 under-resourced police forces. Individual victims have no clear sense where they should report attacks. And some forces have a cash value threshold under which they will not investigate at all.

The result? No metrics except those from suppliers.

It took less than a year from the closing down of the National Hi-Tech Crime Unit in April 2006 for law enforcement groups to propose a replacement, run by London’s Metropolitan Police. But so far the Home Office has refused to put its hand in its pocket.

The government must fund the Met scheme. Any crime multiplying eight-fold in 12 months needs to be addressed.

And there is a longer game. The sooner the UK can modernise its law enforcement to cope with 21st century crimes, the better it can compete globally and the more it can benefit from helping other countries facing similar problems.

The UK needs a central law enforcement unit addressing electronic crime. Only then can we stop relying on software companies to tell us what is going on.